The consequences of cruel budget cuts could be a permanently crippled economy.
Photo Credit: via YouTube/Moyers & Co.
Paul Krugman has some dismal news in
Friday's column.
The perverse mania for austerity while various economies were
sputtering during the Great Recession may not just have been bad policy
at the time. It may have done lasting damage and crippled longterm
growth.
Initially, Krugman writes, policy makers here in the U.S. did more or less the right thing.
The
Federal Reserve and other central banks realized that supporting the
financial system took priority over conventional notions of monetary
prudence. The Obama administration and its counterparts realized that in
a slumping economy budget deficits were helpful, not harmful. And the
money-printing and borrowing worked: A repeat of the Great Depression,
which seemed all too possible at the time, was avoided.
But
it didn't last. Around 2010, things took a fateful turn when "the
policy elite on both sides of the Atlantic decided to stop worrying
about unemployment and start worrying about budget deficits instead."
People
espousing this approach were perceived as "Very Serious People.,"
despite any lack of analysis or evidence. Meanwhile, economists like
Krugman, who pointed out the folly of "deficit fetishism" and the fact
that it would deepen the recession were painted as irresponsible.
The so-called spendthrifts were vindicated by events. Krugman:
More than four and a half years have passed since Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles warned of
a fiscal crisis within two years; U.S. borrowing costs remain at
historic lows. Meanwhile, the austerity policies that were put into
place in 2010 and after had exactly the depressing effects textbook economics predicted; the confidence fairy never did put in an appearance.
But
Krugman is hardly celebrating, because it now appears that austerity
policies have wreaked more damage than even he predicted, the kind of
damage that is harder to recover from, a crippling of long-term growth.
Krugman again:
The
idea that policies that depress the economy in the short run also
inflict lasting damage is generally referred to as “hysteresis.” It’s an
idea with an impressive pedigree: The case for hysteresis was made in a
well-known
1986 paper by
Olivier Blanchard, who later became the chief economist at the
International Monetary Fund, and Lawrence Summers, who served as a top
official in both the Clinton and the Obama administrations. But I think
everyone was hesitant to apply the idea to the Great Recession, for fear
of seeming excessively alarmist.
At this point, however, the
evidence practically screams hysteresis. Even countries that seem to
have largely recovered from the crisis, like the United States, are far
poorer than precrisis projections suggested they would be at this point.
And a new paper by Mr. Summers and Antonio Fatás, in addition to supporting other economists’ conclusion that
the crisis seems to have done enormous long-run damage, shows that the
downgrading of nations’ long-run prospects is strongly correlated with
the amount of austerity they imposed.
Catastrophic
austerity has pretty much eaten its own tail, undermining future tax
receipts and possibly leading to bigger government debt. Oh, the dumb
irony of it all.
Not that any of these lessons are likely to be learned, Krugman concludes ruefully.
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