Democracy in America Our responsibility, our means, our interests

The Economist

American politics

Democracy in America

Our responsibility, our means, our interests

• Dec 2nd 2009, 14:56 by The Economist

IN SPRING 2007, George Bush and David Petraeus took a big gamble. They gambled that an infusion of additional troops into Iraq and a shift to a "clear, hold and build" counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy would produce security gains and create the conditions for political reconciliation there, and, thus, for an American withdrawal in the long term. General Petraeus and a cadre of other brilliant officers had spent the previous two years convincing the president and the rest of the military of the virtues of COIN, and the consensus had gelled that it was time to give it a serious chance to succeed. I remember pretty clearly what I thought at the time. I thought that General Petraeus was right about COIN, right that it was the right way to fight the Iraq war, and wrong that it was going to accomplish anything at this late date. The war had been lost in 2003-4, perhaps even in the chaotic weeks after the fall of Baghdad when American commanders madly refused to take responsibility for the security of the population; and there was no way that an infusion of American troops berming neighbourhoods and trying to deliver population security was going to turn things around.

And I was largely wrong. The "surge" never did lead to political reconciliation in Iraq, and it's entirely possible that, with American troops at last pulling out, the country could collapse into mayhem again. But along with other factors (the "Anbar awakening", the de facto accomplishment of ethnic cleansing, the consolidation of Shia power under an unexpectedly canny and ruthless Maliki government), the surge calmed things down enough for America to hand the country back to the people who live there and withdraw with its head...well, if not "held high", let's say "bloodied but unbowed". The surge may not have created the conditions for political reconciliation in Iraq, but it created the conditions for political reconciliation in America.

Barack Obama announced last night that he is sending 30,000 additional American troops to Afghanistan. His speech did not explain the major shifts in strategy that have been under intense discussion for months now, though we know some of what's happening from other sources. Population security will continue to move up on the list of priorities. Mr Obama again referred to his "civilian surge": hundreds or thousands of new aid workers. Those aid workers will concentrate more on small-scale, quickly-accomplished aid projects like building wells that troops report result in immediate gratitude and loyalty from the population than on long-term infrastructure projects like roads. They will also focus more on agricultural development, while eradication of Afghan's opium trade will be a low priority. Mr Obama emphasised training of the Afghan national army, and cooperation with Pakistan. None of this was surprising, and none of it addressed the glaring inadequacies in each of these policy areas (the corruption of the Afghan national government, Pakistan's intense suspicion of America and lingering tendency to consider backing the Taliban as a possible policy option).

What was noteworthy was Mr Obama's promise of a date, July 2011, by which time he expects to begin drawing down troops. His defence of that decision went as follows:

There are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort—one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government.

The great danger of increasing American commitment is that it weakens the Afghan government, increasing incentives for corruption and sapping responsibility. One of the reasons South Vietnam fell was because the Saigon government never took responsibility for its own security. Setting a loose deadline worked in Iraq, and hopefully it will work in Afghanistan. Most compellingly, Mr Obama then did something that, to my knowledge, neither he nor George Bush had done before: he pointed out that our resources are not infinite, and wars entail trade-offs.

As president, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one.

America is committed to nation-building in Afghanistan. We've made promises there. So we're going to give it our last, best shot. But America also faces a vicious economic recession, a massive budget deficit, and a host of other pressing commitments. Let's hope things turn out as well in Afghanistan as they did in Iraq.

(Photo credit: AFP)