This post is in response to a recent reader's reply to a post suggesting that Obama is going nuclear. The reader, like the vast majority of commentary worldwide in support of nuclear power. While the sentiment against nuclear proliferation of any sort remains high. Those who support nuclear energy are far more prolific. My response comes from several sources. ~ Bear
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In America, a new tourist attraction has opened –
the first nuclear weapons production facility in Hanford, Washington is now open to the public. It’s an interesting choice of destination to say the least. ‘Now that you've won an Olympics Gold Medal, where are you going to celebrate?’ ‘I plan to go to
the most contaminated nuclear site in the United States.’ How do you beat that, we wonder. A tour of Dante’s Inferno, perhaps?
And there’s more bad news for the nuclear industry’s risible claims that nuclear power is safe. Tim Murphy, federal facilities bureau chief for the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, says of the nuclear contamination from the Nevada nuclear weapons test site
creeping ever closer to local drinking water supplies: ‘Unfortunately, today there is no technology to clean this up.’ The Department of Energy’s Bill Wilborn agrees: ‘The only thing we can do at this point is adopt a long-term monitoring plan’. That’s the spirit! A ‘fingers crossed’ approach should do wonders for building public trust in nuclear power. Reports that the nuclear industry’s new slogan is ‘Nuclear power: Because we’re all dead in the long term’ were denied by a spokesman.
The Case Against Nuclear Power
Costly nuclear power poses unnecessary safety and environmental risks, is heavily dependent on taxpayer and ratepayer subsidies, and generates deadly radioactive waste. Building new nuclear power plants will also not effectively address climate change. To learn about the myriad issues associated with nuclear power, explore our educational factsheet series: The Fatal Flaws of Nuclear Power.
Just the Facts: A Look at the Five Fatal Flaws of Nuclear Power
This series of educational fact sheets about nuclear power is aimed at refuting some of the central arguments that nuclear power advocates use when advancing their message. Specifically, there are five key reasons why nuclear power is not a solution to the United States’ energy needs: cost, security, safety, waste, and proliferation.
Nuclear's Fatal Flaws: Cost
For a PDF version of this fact sheet, click here.
Nuclear power came out a winner in the energy bill in 2005, largely due to a renewed push by the Bush administration to build new nuclear reactors for the first time in nearly 30 years. Consumers and the environment lost big. But nuclear power is not a solution to our country’s energy needs. Here are five key reasons: cost, security, safety, waste, and proliferation.
Despite its promise more than 50 years ago of energy “too cheap to meter,” the nuclear power industry continues to be dependent on taxpayer handouts to survive. Since its inception in 1948, this industry has received tens of billions of dollars in federal subsidies but remains unable to compete economically on its own.[1] On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed an energy bill that included over $13 billion in tax breaks and subsidies, as well as other incentives, for the nuclear industry. Here’s a rundown of some of the giveaways to the mature, wealthy industry included in the bill:
Expansion of Current Programs
Limited Liability: The Price-Anderson Act, enacted in 1957 as a temporary, 10-year measure to support the fledgling nuclear industry, limits the amount of primary insurance that nuclear operators must carry to $300 million and caps the total liability of nuclear operators in the event of a serious accident or attack to $10.5 billion. A serious nuclear accident could cost more than $600 billion in 2004 dollars[2] - taxpayers would be responsible for covering the vast majority of that sum. Price-Andersonfor commercial nuclear plants had expired as of Jan. 1, 2004for new reactors only. Reauthorizing the Price-Anderson Act to 2025, as the 2005 energy bill does, extends this subsidy to the proposed new generation of nuclear power plants. The nuclear industry claims that the new designs are “inherently safe.” Inherently safe should mean inherently insurable; therefore, nuclear operators should be able to privately insure them.
License Application Costs: The Nuclear Power 2010 program promotes the building of new nuclear power plants by 2010 by paying for half of the cost to apply for license applications. Through this program, which has received more than $120 million since FY2001, Exelon, Entergy, and Dominion have received funding for three pending Early Site Permit applications to site new reactors in Illinois, Mississippi, and Virginia, respectively. These companies are also part of two of the three consortia that have indicated that they intend to apply for a combined Construction and Operation License (COL) in 2007. DOE has agreed to provide $260 million to the NuStart consortium, and the Dominion-led one has asked for $250 million. The ESP applicants, Entergy, Exelon and Dominion, had combined profits of $4 billion in 2004. The COL consortia members are among the wealthiest corporations in the world, including Bechtel, General Electric, and Duke Power, with more than $27.3 billion in combined profit in 2004.[3] If the nuclear industry believed that the next generation of nuclear plants is a good investment, they would be fully capable of financing both the plants and the research themselves.
Research and Development: The Department of Energy’s Generation IV program provides funding for up to half the cost of the development of new reactor designs. This program has already received more than $92 million since FY2001. The research and development costs for a single design are estimated to range from $610 million to $1 billion, depending on the type of reactor.[4] The nuclear power industry has been given more taxpayer dollars for research and development than all other energy sectors combined. The 2005 energy legislation authorizes another $2.9 billion for nuclear R&D and licensing.
Federal Energy Supply R&D Expenditures, 1948-1998[5]
| Energy R&D Program | Total Federal Expenditure (2003 dollars) | Percent |
| Nuclear Energy | $74 billion | 56% |
| Fossil Fuels | $30.9 billion | 24% |
| Renewables | $14.6 billion | 11% |
| Energy Efficiency | $11.7 billion | 9% |
Other Subsidies for New Plants
Taxpayer-financed New Plant Construction: Despite the current subsidies, the industry wants taxpayers to pay for building new reactors, too. The bill authorizes another $1.25 billion for a nuclear plant in Idaho to co-generate hydrogen fuel. While hydrogen may one day fuel our cars, using nuclear power to create the hydrogen fails to meet clean energy goals by creating thousands of tons of high-level radioactive waste.License applications for new nuclear reactors are also now exempted from NRC antitrust review.
“Risk Insurance”: The energy bill authorizes $2 billion in “risk insurance” to pay the industry for any delays in construction and operation licensing for 6 new reactors, including delays due to the NRC or litigation. Not only is this a waste of taxpayer dollars, it will put pressure on the NRC to rush its review of applications, shortchanging the public of its opportunity to participate in the process and jeopardizing public safety. This provision was not in either the House or Senate bill; it was added in the 11th hour during conference report negotiations.
Production Tax Credits: In order to attempt to make new nuclear power plants appear competitive with other sources of energy, the bill authorizes tax credits for the electricity produced by these reactors. According to the Energy Information Administration, a 1.8-cent tax credit for each kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated electricity from new reactors during the first 8 years of operation will cost $5.7 billion in revenue losses to the U.S. Treasury through 2025.[6]
Loan Guarantees and Power Purchase Agreements: To mitigate the high capital costs of building new reactors, the bill authorizes the federal government to provide unlimited loan guarantees for 80% of the cost of new reactors. This will allow the industry to borrow at government treasury bond rates, rather than at rates typically paid by a large utility making a risky investment. The risk of loan default is estimated to be “well above 50 percent.”[7] The Congressional Research Service estimated that the taxpayer liability for loan guarantees covering up to 50% of the cost of building six new reactors would be $6 billion.[8]
Shutdown Subsidies: The bill changes the rules for funds that are to be used to clean up closed nuclear plant sites, costing taxpayers $1.3 billion.
Anti-Trust Exemption: Exemption of construction and operation license applications for new nuclear reactors from an NRC antitrust review, a potential windfall for energy companies and boondoggle for consumers.
References:
[1] According to the July 2002 Business Case for New Nuclear Power Plants, “without government participation, some risks and costs of new nuclear reactors may remain at unmanageable levels.” The report was prepared by Scully Capital Services, Inc., a Washington-based investment banking and financial services firm. <http://www.nuclear.gov/home/bc/businesscase.html>
[2] Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC-2), Sandia National Laboratory, November 1, 1982.
[3] The cumulative profit does not include the following consortium members: Bechtel, Toshiba, and TVA.
[4] A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems: Ten Nations Today Preparing for Tomorrow’s Energy Needs. Issued by the U.S. DOE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee and the Generation IV International Forum. Dec. 2002. <http://gif.inel.gov/roadmap/pdfs/gen_iv_roadmap.pdf>
[5] Data from Energy Efficiency: Budget, Oil Conservation, and Electricity Conservation Issues, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Fred Sissine, Order Code IB10020, Updated September 22, 2004.
[8] Congressional Research Service, Potential Cost of Nuclear Power Plant Subsidies in S.14, May 7, 2003. Requested by Senator Ron Wyden.
more resources
Nuclear’s Fatal Flaws: Security
For a PDF of this document, click here.
Nuclear plants currently operate at 64 sites in 31 states. Considering the devastation that could result from a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear plant, ensuring their protection should be a priority in a post-September 11 environment. However, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and nuclear industry are leaving plants vulnerable.
What Could Happen?
The 9/11 Commission noted in June 2004 that al Qaeda’s original plan for September 11 was to hijack 10 airplanes and crash two of them into nuclear plants.[1] A successful attack would release “large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment.”[2] A September 2004 study by Dr. Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, using the NRC’s own analysis method, found that a worst-case accident or attack at the Indian Point nuclear plant 35 miles north of New York City could cause up to 43,700 immediate fatalities and up to 518,000 long-term cancer deaths. Such a release could cost up to $2.1 trillion, and would force the permanent relocation of 11.1 million people.[3]
Security Tests Still Inadequate
The best way to evaluate the adequacy of security at a nuclear plant is to subject the guard force to a realistic mock terrorist attack and see how well they are able to defend the plant. These “force-on-force” tests are designed to ensure a plant can defend against a minimum attack scenario, in terms of the number of attackers, their tactics, and their training.
The tests have been upgraded somewhat since September 11. Moreover, plants are still warned months in advance of when a test will take place, allowing them excessive time to prepare for the tests. While the tests previously took place once every 8 years, they are now scheduled once every 3 years. In contrast, the Department of Energy (DOE) conducts tests at its facilities annually. The old test assumed there were only three attackers. This number has been increased, but it is still far fewer than the 19 hijackers involved in the September 11 plot. Further, it was only after Public Citizen filed a lawsuit against the NRC that they agreed to follow their normal rulemaking process in revising the force-on-force tests that allows for public input.
Utilities are also not required to defend nuclear plants against mock attacks from the air or water, even though all nuclear plants are adjacent to lakes, rivers, or oceans. Despite the more lenient conditions of the force-on-force tests prior to September 11, between 1991 and 2001 almost half the plants tested failed to prevent the mock attackers from simulating damage that would result in significant core damage and risk of meltdown.[4] After September 11, the tests were actually suspended and just recently resumed in November 2004.
Conflict of Interest Further Erodes Test Effectiveness
Even though the force-on-force tests are the most crucial factor in evaluating security effectiveness, their integrity has been further undermined by a conflict of interest. Wackenhut Corp. currently holds contracts to guard 31 of the 64 commercial nuclear sites in the U.S. However, in June 2004, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the nuclear industry’s trade association and lobbying arm, was allowed by NRC to hire Wackenhut to conduct the force-on-force exercises at all the nuclear plants in the country. In essence, Wackenhut will be testing itself at half the sites. If the company wants to retain its contract to guard a plant, it would not be difficult for its mock attackers to go easy on plant guards.[5] Without a rigorous and realistic test scenario, the test itself becomes meaningless. Wackenhut has also demonstrated poor performance guarding plants.[6]
Secrecy
The public plays a critical role in providing oversight of the NRC and its enforcement of security regulations. For example, by knowing how poorly plants performed prior to September 11, we have been able to call for stronger standards, such as forcing inclusion of a truck bomb attack scenario and the creation of uniform training and qualification standards for mock adversaries. However, in August 2004, the NRC announced that it would no longer release any information about security at nuclear plants for fear that publicly identifying major weaknesses could help terrorists.[7]
While some security-related information could be dangerous in the wrong hands, a complete information blackout is unnecessary. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) wrote in a report released in April 2005 that “Security restrictions on sharing of information and analyses are hindering progress in addressing potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel storage to terrorist attacks.”[8] Three years after September 11, NRC should have no reason to fear releasing the results of security tests and inspections, because there should be no major flaws. If there are problems, plants should shut down until they are fixed, not be allowed to hide the problem. Their unwillingness to release any information indicates a lack of confidence.
Irradiated Fuel Still Vulnerable
Most people think the greatest threat is from a reactor meltdown. However, perhaps a greater vulnerability is the irradiated, or “spent,” fuel stored at the reactor site. The irradiated fuel, often stored in a large concrete pool, contains much more radiation than the reactor itself. The General Electric Mark I and Mark II Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) are the most vulnerable in this regard. Nearly one in three reactors in the U.S. is of this design – 32 in all. These reactors store their spent fuel in pools several stories above ground and outside the reactor containment structure, as opposed to on or below the ground and inside the reinforced concrete containment dome.
An NRC report issued in 2000 stated that “Mark I and Mark II secondary containments generally do not appear to have any significant structures that might reduce the likelihood of aircraft penetration,” and that a fuel pool fire could cause casualties up to 500 miles away.[9] NAS wrote in their April 2005 report that “Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets,”[10] and that additional work to understand vulnerabilities “is needed urgently.”[11] The NRC and industry, however, continue to maintain the likelihood of such an attack is too low to worry about.
Also in April 2005, the Government Accountability Office released a report finding that “NRC needs to do more to ensure that power plants are effectively controlling spent nuclear fuel,” which could be used to construct a dirty bomb.[12]
REFERENCES:
[1] The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 154; <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/>.
[2]“Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage,” National Academy of Sciences, April 2005; p. 57.
[3]Dr. Edwin S. Lyman, “Chernobyl on the Hudson? The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant,” Riverkeeper, Inc., September 2004.
[9]“Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk Report,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 2000; p. 3-23.
Nuclear’s Fatal Flaws: Safety
For a PDF of this document, click here.
The safe operation of nuclear plants ought to be the paramount mission of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), but recent events and trends indicates a policy that is overly accommodating to the wishes of industry—even to the point where safety has been compromised. The risk of a catastrophic accident at a nuclear power plant remains, but unfortunately, the NRC has failed to do all in its power to ensure that that risk is minimized.
Deficient Safety Culture at the NRC and in Industry
A 2002 survey of the NRC’s workforce,[1] commissioned by the NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and conducted by an independent contractor, revealed troubling facts about employees’ confidence in the agency’s ability to be an effective regulator. Many employees reported a concern that “NRC is becoming influenced by private industry and its power to regulate is diminishing.” Meanwhile, only slightly more than half of NRC employees reported feeling that it is “safe to speak up in the NRC”—a finding that does not instill confidence in the NRC’s ability to identify potential safety problems before they become serious.
The safety culture of the workforce at some nuclear plants has been so deprived that it has compromised the safe operation of the facilities. At the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear plants in New Jersey, operated by PSEG Nuclear, serious mismanagement and a deficient safety culture led to the deterioration of the physical condition of the plant, a situation brought to light by a whistleblower who had been fired from her job as a manager at the plant—allegedly for voicing safety concerns. Three independent assessments of the situation confirmed the problems at the plant, and an NRC review found “weaknesses in corrective actions and management efforts to establish an environment where employees are consistently willing to raise safety concerns.” The NRC also found a general sentiment among employees of the plants that PSEG had emphasized production over safety.[2]
Case Study: Davis-Besse
Mismanagement by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company and lax oversight by the NRC allowed severe degradation of the nuclear reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, to go unnoticed for years until it was finally discovered in March 2002 that a mere three-eighths of an inch of metal cladding was all that contained the essential coolant pressure boundary of the reactor vessel, a dire situation that could have easily led to a reactor breach, subsequent loss of coolant, and potential meltdown.
A December 2002 report by the NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that the NRC’s decision to allow the continued operation of Davis-Besse “was driven in large part by a desire to lessen the financial impact on [FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company] that would result from an early shutdown.” The OIG further concluded that the “NRC appears to have informally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute proof of a safety problem, versus lack of reasonable assurance of maintaining public health and safety, before it will act to shut down a power plant.”[3]
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)—the investigative arm of Congress—also sternly criticized the NRC for its failure to discover the problem at Davis-Besse sooner, finding in a May 2004 report that the NRC’s inadequate oversight prevented an earlier shutdown, even though the agency was fully aware of the potential for the problem, which had manifested at other facilities. The GAO further expressed dismay that the NRC lacks formal guidance procedures for deciding whether to shut down a plant.[4]
The NRC proposed $5.45 million fine against FirstEnergy in April 2005, but this fine does not correct the NRC’s emphasis on plant production and profitability, which inhibited an earlier shutdown and inspection of the troubled plant. The NRC allowed Davis-Besse to restart in March 2004.
License Renewals & Power Uprates
As many of the initial 40-year operating licenses for nuclear power reactors begin to expire, the NRC has been aggressively renewing operating licenses for an additional 20 years. Since 2000, the NRC has approved license extensions for 32 reactors at 18 power stations, and another eight renewal applications are under review for 16 power reactors. In the near term, 17 more applications for license extensions of 22 reactors are expected.[5] So far, not a single application has been denied, despite the inevitable fatigue of critical components and the fact that onsite storage of waste and security of fuel pools remain serious unresolved issues.
Meanwhile, the NRC has been allowing operators to increase reactor power, issuing 102 power uprates since 1977 for a total amplification of 4185.5 megawatts electric (MWe).[6] The NRC expects power uprate requests at another 24 plants within the next several years that, if approved, would result in a power increase of about 1692 MWe.[7]
Such license for extended and amplified reactor operation does not come without cost, and this regulatory laissez-faire may be compromising the safety of these facilities. For example, following the Extended Power Uprate (EPU) in 2001 at Exelon’s Quad Cities and Dresden nuclear power stations in Illinois—each of which increased reactor power by about 17 percent—the operator discovered multiple cracks in the steam dryers of each of the four reactors at the two stations. Loose debris from the cracked components were found in the reactor coolant system and likely ended up at the bottom of the reactor vessel at one of the Quad Cities reactors. Inspectors at the plants also observed “flow-induced vibration damage on components and supports for the main steam and feedwater lines,” as well as other power uprate-induced problems at the plants. As a result, Exelon was forced to return the Quad Cities reactors to pre-EPU levels.[8] But despite Exelon’s serious problems, the NRC has continued to allow other similar reactors to operate at extremely high power levels.
NRC Restricts Industry Accountability for Safety
The NRC has revised its licensing processes to give “certainty” to the industry through the limitation of public involvement in NRC licensing and regulatory actions. Under this new regime, the NRC has effectively crippled the public’s ability to raise important questions about the safety of operating and proposed nuclear facilities, and it has impaired the ability of stakeholders to effectively judge the NRC’s capacity to ensure that safety.
In January 2004, the NRC formalized revisions to its regulations governing the conduct of adjudicatory hearings, making it much more difficult for the public to challenge license applications and agency rules and regulations.[9] The new rules sets strict deadlines and standards that must be met for a legal challenge to NRC actions, and they deny intervening parties the right to an on-the-record hearing in reactor licensing proceedings, eviscerating the public’s role in such actions.
Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the NRC revised its reactor licensing process, splitting it into two stages: one for permitting a specific site, and another for licensing construction and operation of a reactor. This artificial licensing division prevents the public from raising important safety concerns early in the licensing process.
The NRC has also proposed a rule that would greatly broaden the scope of nuclear industry information that would be restricted from public access.[10] Ostensibly designed to secure information that could be employed illicitly by saboteurs, the rules are written so broadly that virtually any information even tangentially related to security may be withheld from the public, including engineering and safety analyses and inspection reports on nuclear facilities. Access to such information is critical to public oversight of the safety of nuclear facilities, but if the proposed rule goes into effect, the public will be left in the dark.
REFERENCES:
[1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the Inspector General, “OIG 2002 Survey of NRC’s Safety Culture and Climate,” OIG-03-A-03, Dec. 11, 2002.
[2] Hubert J. Miller, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to E. J. Ferland, Public Service Enterprise Group, July 30, 2004.
[3] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the Inspector General, “Event Inquiry: NRC’s Regulation of Davis-Besse Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head,” Case No. 02-03S, Dec. 30, 2002.
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant’s Shutdown, GAO-04-415, May 2004.
[5] Nuclear Energy Institute, May 10, 2005 .
[6] Nuclear Energy Institute, “Approved Power Uprates (1977-2004),” March 2004 .
[7] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Status Report on Power Uprates,” SECY-04-0104, June 24, 2004: 4.
[9] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Changes to Adjudicatory Process,” Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 9, Jan. 14, 2004: 2182-2282.
[10] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Protection of Safeguards Information,” Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 28, Feb. 11, 2005: 7196-7217.
Nuclear's Fatal Flaws: Waste
For a PDF of this document, click here.
Nuclear power is not a clean energy source: it produces both low and high-level radioactive waste that remains dangerous for several hundred thousand years. Generated throughout all parts of the fuel cycle, this waste poses a serious danger to human health. Currently, over 2,000 metric tons of high-level radioactive waste and 12 million cubic feet of low level radioactive waste are produced annually by the 103 operating reactors in the United States. No country in the world has found a solution for this waste. Building new nuclear plants would mean the production of much more of this dangerous waste with no where for it to go.
Uranium Mining and Processing
Uranium must be mined and enriched to form fuel for nuclear reactors. Each of these procedures results in radioactive contamination of the environment and risks to public health. Most uranium mining in the U.S. takes place in Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming – areas of the country that are suffering from its effects. Uranium is mined by physically removing uranium ore, or by extracting the uranium in a newer process known as in situ leaching. Conventional mining has caused dust and radon inhalation for workers – resulting in high rates of lung cancer and other respiratory diseases – and both types of mining have caused serious contamination of groundwater. When conventionally mined, uranium metal must be separated from the rock in a process called milling, which forms large radon-contaminated piles of material known as tailings. These tailings are often abandoned aboveground. Twelve million tons of tailings, for instance, are piled at present along the Colorado River near Moab, Utah, threatening communities downstream. In the case of in situ leaching, a solution is pumped into the ground to dissolve the uranium. When the mixture is returned to the surface, the uranium is then separated and evaporated in slurry pools.
Following this separation, uranium is sent to a facility for enrichment – a process that concentrates the amount of fissile uranium. Enrichment produces toxic hydrogen fluoride gas and large amounts of depleted uranium. Depleted uranium poses a threat to public health and should be disposed of in a geologic repository.
Waste from Reactors
Over 54,000 metric tons of irradiated fuel has already accumulated at the sites of commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. There are several proposals to manage such highly radioactive waste, but none of them would satisfactorily deal with the material.
YuccaMountain
The Yucca Mountain project has found itself beset with controversy and may very well never open. Numerous unresolved problems remain with the geologic and hydrologic suitability of the proposed site, and serious questions have been raised about its ability to contain highly radioactive waste for the time required. In December 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) missed its stated license application deadline for the project. DOE currently has no estimate of when it will submit its application. In July 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the time limit set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during which radiation in the groundwater at the site boundary must meet federal drinking water standards was inadequate and illegal. The 1992 Energy Policy Act requires the EPA to set public health and safety standards for Yucca Mountain “based upon and consistent with” the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). In August 2005, the EPA released a revised standard for the site. The proposed standard, however, is still inadequate for protecting public health, and would be the least protective radiation standard in the world.
Scientific fraud is also a longstanding problem in the research on the site. Most recent problems include:
- In March 2005, DOE and the U.S. Geological Survey revealed emails showing that USGS scientists falsified data related to quality assurance and modeling of water infiltration at the site. Quality assurance (QA) is extremely important to good science, because QA procedures are established to ensure that the data are generated, documented, and reported correctly. The data in question deals with how rapidly water can travel through the mountain, corrode waste containers, and release the material into the environment. There have been other issues in the past with the movement of water through Yucca Mountain.
- In December 2005, DOE instructed Bechtel SAIC LLC, its main contractor, to cease engineering work and safety assessment on key areas of the site due to poor QA and design control practices.
- In January 2006, the NRC found that researchers incorrectly measured the amount of corrosion on the metals, and overestimated the ability of the metals to isolate nuclear waste in engineered packages.
Private Fuel Storage
Private Fuel Storage (PFS) is a consortium of eight commercial nuclear utilities that has been granted a license by NRC to open an aboveground “interim” storage site for 40,000 metric tons of irradiated fuel on Goshute land in Utah. The license still requires the approval of the Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and three of the companies involved in the project have recently withdrawn or withheld funding from the consortium.
Even if opened, PFS will not solve the waste problem, even temporarily. Waste will always be on-site at operating reactors in order to cool. By transporting waste and storing it above ground in yet another part of the country, PFS will just make the existing problem worse. The “temporary” nature PFS is also questionable, because the project is completely dependent on the opening of Yucca Mountain. PFS raises serious environmental justice issues, because the lease on which PFS is based is mired in controversy and corruption.
Reprocessing, Fast Reactors, and Transmutation
Fast reactors, in combination with reprocessing and transmutation, have recently been proposed by the Bush administration as a way to deal with the waste. Despite this push, these technologies are not a solution to this country’s nuclear waste problem. Reprocessing is the chemical process of extracting uranium, and plutonium from irradiated fuel after it is removed from a reactor. Reprocessing process is extremely expensive, poses a security threat, leads to environmental contamination, and does not eliminate the need for a repository.
Fast neutron reactors – high temperature reactors that use separated plutonium and have an inert gas or liquid metal as a coolant – have been put forward as a way to reduce the radioactivity of spent fuel by converting long-lived radionuclides in the waste into shorter-lived radionuclides, a process known as transmutation.
But fast neutron reactors have a terrible track record in safety and are incredibly expensive. These reactor designs also have many remaining technological problems, including the difficulties of using plutonium fuels in operating reactors, low rates of transmutation, unproven fuel fabrication systems, and dangers to workers making the fuel. Even if these problems were addressed, fast-neutron reactors would not eliminate the need for a repository.
Transportation
The continued production of radioactive waste will also require its regular transportation through communities across the country. Transportation routes to Yucca Mountain, for instance, by rail, road and barge, would pass through as many as 45 states and the District of Columbia, putting the dangerous waste within half a mile of 50 million people. The transportation of high-level radioactive waste on this scale, and over such long distances, is unprecedented.
In February 2006, the National Academies of Science (NAS) released a report on the transport of irradiated fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States, which identifies several vital issues that must be studied before any large-scale shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel commence. These issues include full-scale crash testing of transport packages under severe accident conditions, a study of security issues, and a study of very-long-duration fires before any waste is shipped. In addition to these technical concerns about transportation, the report questioned DOE’s preparedness for such large-scale shipments, and concluded “the challenges of sustained implementation should not be underestimated.” It is clear from the report’s recommendations that DOE is not meeting the basic requirements for safe transport.
Nuclear's Fatal Flaws: Proliferation
For a PDF version of this document, click here.
International treaties leave non-weapons states free to use and develop sensitive nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. While such technologies are ostensibly employed to create fuel in power reactors, they may be easily adjusted or redirected to produce weapons-grade fissile material. Moreover, power reactors themselves produce plutonium, which may be used in bombs. Once the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, it becomes impossible to restrict its use to “peaceful” purposes.
In practice, there is no way to segregate nuclear technologies employed for “peaceful” purposes from technologies that may be employed in weapons—the former may be, and have been, transformed into the latter. The myth of the “peaceful atom” is belied by the easy modification of a nuclear energy infrastructure to create the material required for a nuclear bomb.
The Fatal Flaw of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
While it is considered one of the most successful international arms-control agreements ever instituted, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or “NPT”—suffers a fatal flaw: Article IV of the NPT allows and even encourages signatories to develop nuclear technology for “peaceful purposes,” such as for the production of electricity, calling such use the “inalienable right” of all parties to the treaty. Article IV further encourages NPT signatories to engage in the “fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Non-nuclear-weapons states are especially encouraged to participate in commercial nuclear power development.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is designated as the regulator of this activity, charged with the task of preventing the “diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” but in such a way so as not to hamper the development of nuclear technology in non-weapons states, even allowing “the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.” This potential illicit use of such fuel-cycle technology is now becoming manifest in the case of North Korea and perhaps Iran, prompting the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, to envision the near-term possibility of as many as 30 “virtual” nuclear-weapons states that could “move within months into converting their civilian capacity or capability into a weapons program.”[1]
Furthermore, Article X of the NPT gives signatories the right to withdraw at their discretion, requiring only three-months of advance notice. Thus non-weapons countries may fully develop nuclear technology while a party to the treaty, being subject to the inspections and protection of the IAEA, but then withdraw without having to forsake their acquired nuclear technology. Such is precisely the case with North Korea, which withdrew from the international pact in January 2003.
The Case of Iran
Non-nuclear weapons states that have been discouraged by Western states from developing fuel-cycle technologies such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing may view renewed U.S. interest in such technology capacity as hypocritical—making them less likely to fully abide by the terms of the NPT. Iran, a party to the NPT, has recently been a subject of international concern, as it is suspected of developing nuclear weapons capabilities as part of its nuclear program. Yet Iran has defended its right to enrich uranium under the NPT, and it has returned American accusations with criticisms of the Bush administration’s own failure to hold up its end of the bargain by conducting research into new nuclear weapons, spurning the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to prohibit explosive tests of nuclear devices, and unilaterally retreating from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. The NPT requires weapons states to take steps towards total disarmament.
The Schizophrenic Character of the IAEA
Charged at once with promoting and regulating the international nuclear industry, the IAEA has the confused mission of promoting the broad dispersion and application of nuclear technology while trying to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. But the easy and perhaps inevitable migration of “peaceful” applications to illicit ones makes this dual mission impossible.
One of IAEA’s major programs (“Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Science”) exists to forward the development of member states’ nuclear programs, including fuel cycle facilities, and is described as a “fundamental mandate” of the Agency. This division had an annual budget of more than $24 million in 2005, about 9% of the IAEA’s total budget for that year. While most of the IAEA budget goes to security and monitoring, at least $43 million or 15% of the IAEA’s annual budget for 2005 went to various programs promoting nuclear technologies, many of which involve uranium enrichment and waste reprocessing, which can be diverted for illicit use.[2]
Mohamed ElBaradei’s Proposed Moratorium on New Fuel Cycle Facilities
Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, has proposed a five year moratorium on the construction of new fuel cycle facilities, particularly uranium enrichment plants, in order that the Agency may attain a greater degree of control over the spread of fissile nuclear material, considered to be the essential “choke point” to prevent the development of nuclear weapons.[3] But ElBaradei’s proposal is opposed by major Western nuclear weapons states—including the United States, Japan, and France—which have fuel cycle projects in the works.
In the United States, two companies—USEC and the European firm Urenco—have applied to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for permits to build and operate uranium enrichment facilities, precisely the sort of operation ElBaradei wants to curtail. Despite the fact that Urenco is a European company that has been implicated in security breaches that led to the establishment of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology black market that fueled the nuclear programs of states like Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran,[4] the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has waived the standard foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) review for Urenco.[5]
Pathway to Plutonium
Reprocessing—a technology that separates uranium and plutonium from irradiated fuel—runs counter to efforts to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies and materials. Separated plutonium is easier to steal and employ in nuclear weapons than plutonium in highly radioactive irradiated fuel, because the intense radiation of the latter form prevents easy acquisition of the plutonium. It is widely recognized by nuclear power experts that the “once-through” fuel cycle—without reprocessing—is the only truly proliferation-resistant form of fuel production.[6]
Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has maintained an official policy against the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, due to proliferation concerns. But recent trends indicate an increasing interest by the U.S. in this risky technology as a “fuel management program.” Plutonium separated from irradiated fuel can be used in some nuclear reactors in a form called mixed oxide (or MOX) fuel. In the past three years, the DOE has received more than $190 million for research and development of new reprocessing technologies for commercial irradiated nuclear fuel, and President Bush’s fiscal year 2006 budget request to Congress for this program includes another $70 million. Further, the NRC has just licensed a MOX fuel fabrication facility and has authorized the use of such fuel in a nuclear plant in South Carolina.[7] While the initial source of fuel would come from dismantled weapons from the U.S. stockpile, the production and use of MOX fuel from dismantled weapons could lead to an institutional push to reprocess irradiated fuel from commercial reactors.
Finally, the concern over the glut of easily-diverted, reprocessed MOX fuel is the fact that demand has not kept pace with supply, resulting in a surplus approximately 200 metric tons of separated commercial plutonium worldwide from reprocessing.[8]
REFERENCES:
[1] Associated Press, “U.N. Nuclear Chief Pushes ‘Sea Change,’” The New York Times, May 7, 2005.
[2]International Atomic Energy Agency, Programme and Budget for 2004 – 2005, August 2003 .
[3]Mohamed ElBaradei, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, May 2, 2005.
[4]Adam Zagorin, “Nukes: To Pyongyang from Nashville?” Time Online Edition, Jan. 21, 2003, . See also Marilyn Berlin Snell, “Dangerous Liaisons,” Sierra, May/June 2005: 30-36.
[5]Marshall O. Combs, U.S. Department of Energy, letter to Roy P. Zimmerman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 31, 2005.
[6]See, for example, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power, 2003: “Radiation exposure from spent fuel that is not reprocessed is a strong, but not certain, barrier to theft and misuse” (22).
[7]U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Authorizes Construction of Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at Savannah River Site,” press release, March 30, 2005; “NRC Authorizes Use of Mixed Oxide Fuel Assemblies at Catawba Nuclear Power Plant,” press release, March 3, 2005.
[8]MIT: 22.
Nuclear's Fatal Flaws: Summary
For a PDF of this document, click here.
Nuclear power has made headlines recently as a possible player in the energy future of the U.S., after decades of decline. But how do claims by industry and government champions stack up against the unsolved problems and dangers nuclear energy poses?
Cost
Despite its promise more than 50 years ago of energy "too cheap to meter," nuclear power continues to be dependent on taxpayer handouts to survive. From 1947 through 1999 the nuclear industry was given over $115 billion in direct taxpayer subsidies. Including Price Anderson limitations on nuclear liability, the federal subsidies reach $145.4 billion. To put this in perspective, federal government subsidies for wind and solar totaled $5.7 billion over the same period. The management of radioactive waste and the requirements for reactor decommissioning also require additional funds. Other aspects of nuclear power, such as the pollution from uranium mining, risks from nuclear weapons proliferation, dangers of reactor accidents, and the legacy of radioactive waste, are further hidden costs.
More Federal Subsidies
The high capital costs and long construction times of reactors make new reactors prohibitively expensive unless they are heavily subsidized by taxpayers. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contains over $13 billion dollars in new subsidies and tax breaks, as well as other incentives, for the nuclear industry,1 including:
• Reauthorization of the Price-Anderson Act, which limits industry liability in case of a severe accident; the rest of the tab would be picked up by taxpayers – possibly over $500 billion
• More than $1 billion for research and development of new reactor designs and reprocessing technologies
• Authorization of $2 billion in "risk insurance" to pay the industry for delays in construction and operation licensing for 6 new reactors, including delays due to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or litigation.
• Authorization of more than $1.25 billion for the construction of a nuclear plant in Idaho
• Tax credits for electricity production, estimated to cost $5.7 billion by 20252
• Unlimited loan guarantees to back up to 80% of the cost of construction in case of default
Even with these incentives, Standard & Poor's recently concluded that such subsidies "may not be enough to mitigate the risks associated with operating issues and high capital costs that could hinder credit quality."3
Why is Cost Important?
With the limited amount of money available to spend on tackling global climate change, we need to obtain the greatest reduction in carbon emissions per dollar spent. The high cost of nuclear power means that resources wasted on nuclear power take away from faster, cheaper, and cleaner solutions to climate change.
Waste
Nuclear power is not a clean energy source. In fact, it produces both low and high-level radioactive waste that remains dangerous for several hundred thousand years. Generated throughout all parts of the fuel cycle, this waste poses a serious danger to human health. Currently, over 2,000 metric tons of high-level radioactive waste and 12 million cubic feet of low level radioactive waste are produced annually by the 103 operating reactors in the United States.4 No country in the world has found a solution for this waste. Building new nuclear plants would mean the production of much more of this dangerous waste with no where for it to go.
Uranium Mining and Processing
Uranium must be mined and enriched to form fuel for nuclear reactors. Each of these procedures results in radioactive contamination of the environment and risks to public health. Most uranium mining in the U.S. takes place in Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming – areas of the country that are suffering from its effects. Uranium is mined by physically removing uranium ore, or by extracting the uranium in a newer process known as in situ leaching. Conventional mining has caused dust and radon inhalation for workers – resulting in high rates of lung cancer and other respiratory diseases – and both types of mining have caused serious contamination of groundwater. When conventionally mined, uranium metal must be separated from the rock in a process called milling, which forms large radon-contaminated piles of material known as tailings. These tailings are often abandoned aboveground. Twelve million tons of tailings, for instance, are piled along the Colorado River near Moab, Utah, threatening communities downstream. In the case of in situ leaching, a solution is pumped into the ground to dissolve the uranium. When the mixture is returned to the surface, the uranium is separated and the remaining waste water evaporated in slurry pools. Following this separation, uranium is sent to a facility for enrichment – a process that concentrates the amount of fissile uranium. Enrichment produces toxic hydrogen fluoride gas and large amounts of depleted uranium. Depleted uranium poses a threat to public health and should be disposed of in a geologic repository.
Waste from Reactors
Over 54,000 metric tons of irradiated fuel has accumulated at the sites of commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. There are several proposals to manage this highly radioactive waste, but none of them would satisfactorily deal with the material.
Yucca Mountain
The Yucca Mountain project continues to be mired in controversy and may very well never open. Numerous unresolved problems remain with the geologic and hydrologic suitability of the proposed site, and serious questions have been raised about its ability to contain highly radioactive waste for the time required. In December 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) missed its stated license application deadline for the project. DOE currently has no estimate of when it will submit its application. In July 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the time limit set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during which radiation in the groundwater at the site boundary must meet federal drinking water standards was inadequate and illegal. In August 2005, the EPA released a revised standard for the site. The proposed standard, however, still fails to safeguard public health, and would be the least protective radiation standard in the world.
Scientific fraud is also a longstanding problem in the research on the site. In March 2005, DOE and the U.S. Geological Survey revealed emails showing that USGS scientists falsified data related to quality assurance and modeling of water infiltration at the site. Quality assurance (QA) is extremely important to good science, because QA procedures are established to ensure that the data are generated, documented, and reported correctly. The data in question deals with how rapidly water can travel through the mountain, corrode waste containers, and release the material into the environment. There have been other issues in the past with the movement of water through Yucca Mountain.5
Private Fuel Sorage
Private Fuel Storage (PFS) is a consortium of eight commercial nuclear utilities seeking to open an aboveground "interim" storage site for 40,000 metric tons of irradiated fuel on Goshute land in Utah. After an eight year struggle, NRC granted the consortium a license in September 2005, but the license still requires the approval of the Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Three of the companies involved in the project have also recently withdrawn or decided to withhold funding from the consortium. If opened, PFS would not solve the waste problem, even temporarily. By transporting waste and storing it above ground in yet another part of the country, PFS will just make the existing waste problem worse. The "temporary" nature PFS is also questionable, because the project is completely dependent on the opening of Yucca Mountain. PFS raises serious environmental justice issues, because the lease with the Goshute Tribe on which PFS is based is mired in controversy and corruption.
Reprocessing,Fast Reactors, and Transmutation
Fast reactors, in combination with reprocessing and transmutation, have also been proposed by the Bush Administration as a way to deal with the waste produced by nuclear power. Specifically, fast neutron reactors – high temperature reactors that use separated plutonium and have an inert gas or liquid metal as a coolant – have been put forth as a way to reduce the radioactivity of the waste by converting long-lived radionuclides into shorter-lived radionuclides in a process known as transmutation. But fast neutron reactors have a terrible track record in safety and are incredibly expensive. These reactor designs also have many remaining technological problems, including the difficulties of using plutonium fuels in operating reactors, low rates of transmutation, unproven fuel fabrication systems, and dangers to workers making the fuel. Even if these problems were addressed, fast-neutron reactors would not eliminate the need for a repository.
Reprocessing, the chemical process of extracting uranium and plutonium from irradiated fuel after it is removed from a reactor, also has problems. Reprocessing technology, which is an essential component of the fast reactor cycle, is extremely expensive, poses a security threat, leads to environmental contamination, and also does not eliminate the need for a repository.
Security
Nuclear plants currently operate at 64 sites in 31 states. Considering the devastation that could result from a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear plant, ensuring their protection should be a priority in a post-September 11 environment. However, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and nuclear industry are leaving plants vulnerable.
What Could Happen?
The 9/11 Commission noted in June 2004 that al Qaeda’s original plan for September 11 was to hijack 10 airplanes and crash two of them into nuclear plants.6 A September 2004 study by Dr. Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, using the NRC’s own analysis method, found that a worst-case accident or attack at the Indian Point nuclear plant 35 miles north of New York City could cause up to 43,700 immediate fatalities and up to 518,000 long-term cancer deaths. Such a release could cost up to $2.1 trillion, and would force the permanent relocation of 11.1 million people.7
Security Tests Still Inadequate
Between 1991 and 2001 almost half the plants tested failed to prevent mock attackers from simulating damage that would result in significant core damage and risk of meltdown – even though guards were defending against a group of only three attackers. After being suspended and revised following September 11, 2001, the new tests have less than double that number, according to Time Magazine and other sources. That’s far fewer than the 19 we have already experienced.
Safety
A 2002 survey of the NRC’s workforce, commissioned by the NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and conducted by an independent contractor, revealed troubling facts about employees’ confidence in the agency’s ability to be an effective regulator.8 Many employees reported a concern that "NRC is becoming influenced by private industry and its power to regulate is diminishing." Meanwhile, only slightly more than half of NRC employees reported feeling that it is "safe to speak up in the NRC"—a finding that does not instill confidence in the NRC’s ability to identify potential safety problems before they become serious.
At the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear plants in New Jersey, operated by PSEG Nuclear, serious mismanagement and a deficient safety culture in fact led to the deterioration of the physical condition of the plant - a situation brought to light by a whistleblower who had been fired from her job as a manager at the plant allegedly for voicing safety concerns. Three independent assessments of the situation confirmed the problems at the plant, and an NRC review found "weaknesses in corrective actions and management efforts to establish an environment where employees are consistently willing to raise safety concerns." The NRC also found a general sentiment among employees of the plants that PSEG had emphasized production over safety.9
Case Study: Davis-Besse
Mismanagement by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company and lax oversight by the NRC allowed severe degradation of the nuclear reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, to go unnoticed for years until it was finally discovered in March 2002 that a mere three-eighths of an inch of metal ladding was all that contained the essential coolant pressure boundary of the reactor vessel, a dire situation that could have easily led to a reactor breach, subsequent loss of coolant, and potential meltdown.
A December 2002 report by the NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that the NRC’s decision to allow the continued operation of Davis-Besse "was driven in large part by a desire to lessen the financial impact on [FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company] that would result from an early shutdown."
The OIG further concluded that the "NRC appears to have informally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute proof of a safety problem, versus lack of reasonable assurance of maintaining public health and safety, before it will act to shut down a power plant."10
Case Study: Tritium Leaks and Ground Water Contamination
The nuclear industry has also recently come under fire for leaking tritium - a radioactive isotope of hydrogen - into the groundwater of areas surrounding nuclear plants. Leaks have been reported at the Braidwood, Byron, and Dresden reactors in Illinois, the Palo Verde reactors in Arizona, and the Indian Point nuclear plant near New York City. Even worse, nuclear energy companies have kept the discoveries of these leaks from the public, sometimes for several years. Tritium is a byproduct of nuclear generation and can enter the body through ingestion, absorption or inhalation. Long-term exposure can increase the risk of cancer, birth defects and genetic damage. In June 2005, the most recent study from National Academies of Science (NAS) reaffirmed that there is no level of radiation exposure that is harmless or beneficial, and that even the smallest dose of ionizing radiation is capable of contributing to the development of cancer. Tritium takes about 250 years to decay to negligible levels, and is very difficult to remove from water. 4
Proliferation
Nuclear power also increases the risks the nuclear weapons proliferation. As more reactors are built around the world, nuclear material becomes more vulnerable to theft and diversion. Power reactors have also historically led directly to nuclear weapons programs in many countries.
Sensitive nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing are ostensibly employed to create fuel in power reactors, they may be easily adjusted or redirected to produce weapons-grade fissile material. Moreover, power reactors themselves produce plutonium, which may be used in bombs. In practice, there is no way to segregate nuclear technologies employed for "peaceful" purposes from technologies that may be employed in weapons—the former may be, and have been, transformed into the latter.
Climate Change
The vast majority of public interest and environmental groups are adamantly opposed to nuclear power because it creates dangerous waste, brings unnecessary risks, and cannot rescue us from climate change. Over 300 national, state, and local organizations have endorsed a statement clearly outlining their reasons for continuing to oppose to nuclear power as a solution to climate change,11 while not a single environmental group is advocating for more nuclear plants. Nuclear power is too slow, expensive, and inflexible a technology to address climate change, and would entail the building of thousands of new nuclear reactors. These reactors would result in intensified proliferation, waste, and safety problems. These reactors would also drain investment away from renewable technologies. According to a new analysis by Public Citizen based on the work of governments, universities and other organizations in the United States, Europe and Japan, it is technically and economically feasible for a diverse mix of existing renewable technologies to completely meet U.S. energy needs over the coming decades.12 Clean, safe renewable energy sources – such as wind, solar, advanced hydroelectric and some types of biomass and geothermal energy – can reliably generate as much energy as conventional fuels without significant carbon emissions, destructive mining or the production of radioactive waste.
Updated April 2006
For More Information Contact Public Citizen’s Energy Program at:
cmep@citizen.org · www.energyactivist.org ·
1 .
2 Analysis of Five Selected Tax Provisions of the Conference Energy Bill o 2003, Energy Information Administration, February 2004, p. 3; .
3 Standard and Poor’s, Credit Aspects of North American And European Nuclear Power, January 9, 2006
4 According to data provided by the three low-level commercial waste facility operators, they accepted 12 million cubic feet of low-level waste in 2003. When reactor licenses expire in the next twenty to thirty years, decommissioning (cleaning up closed reactor sites) is expected to vastly increase the amount of low-level waste needing disposal.
5 In 1996, a team of researchers from Sandia National Laboratory doing work on water infiltration at Yucca Mountain detected chlorine-36 (a radioactive isotope of chlorine not found significantly in nature) at repository depth. After further investigation, the team determined that the Cl-36 had likely come from the atmospheric atomic bomb tests over the Pacific, and thus indicated that water had entered and moved through the rock at Yucca Mountain in the last fifty years.
6 The 9/11 Commission Repor Final Report of the National Commission on TerrorisAttacks Upon the United States, p. 154; .
7 Dr. Edwin S. Lyman, "Chernobyl on the Hudson? The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant," Riverkeeper, Inc., September 2004.
8 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the Inspector General, "OIG 2002 Survey of NRC’s Safety Culture and Climate," OIG-03-A-03, Dec. 11, 2002.
9 Hubert J. Miller, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to E. J. Ferland, Public Service Enterprise Group, July 30, 2004.
10 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the Inspector General, "Event Inquiry: NRC’s Regulation of Davis-Besse Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head," Case No. 02-03S, Dec. 30, 2002.
11 .
12 Public Citizen, "Renewable Energy is Capable of Meeting Our Needs", April 2006, http://www.citizen.org/documents/RenewableEnergy.pdf .
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